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Abstract
Our paper contributes to the literature recommending approaches to make online
reviews more credible and representative. We analyze data from four diverse major
online retailers and find that verified customers who are prompted (by an email) to
write a review, submit, on average, up to 0.5 star higher ratings than self-motivated web
reviewers. Moreover, these email-prompted reviews remain stable over time, whereas
web reviews exhibit a downward trend. This finding provides support for the existence
of social influence and selection biases during the submission of a web review, when
social signals are being displayed. In contrast, no information about the current state of
the reviews is displayed in the email promptings. Moreover, we find that when a retailer
decides to start sending email promptings, the existing population of web reviewers is
unaffected both in their volume as well as the characteristics of their submitted reviews.
We explore how our combined findings can suggest ways to mitigate various biases
that govern online review submissions and help practitioners provide more credible,
representative and higher ratings to their customers.
1 Introduction
‘Word of Mouth’ (WOM), defined as an informal communication between private parties
concerning the evaluation of goods and services (Westbrook, 1987; Singh, 1988; Fornell and
Bookstein, 1982; Dichter, 1966), has been part of human behavior for a long time. With the
rise of the Internet, WOM has evolved and changed. Even though ‘traditional’ WOM will
not be eliminated anytime soon (e.g., think of friends and family telling us about the latest
shows they’ve watched on TV), ‘electronic’ word of mouth (eWOM) (Hennig-Thurau et al.,
2004) offers the significant advantage that users are no longer forced to rely on scattered
signals from their immediate social network to be informed about the quality of a product,
but instead can access reviews from all over the world in an organized and on-demand way.
Indeed, reviews are being collected, aggregated and displayed to consumers in an easy-to-
digest format in all types of settings: all of the top-10 U.S. online retailers (as well as most
of the biggest retailers in the rest of the world, such as Alibaba) collect and display user
reviews for their products. The same is true for all the major digital stores. Furthermore,
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companies like Yelp, Facebook, Google, IMDb and Rotten Tomatoes provide platforms for
users to submit reviews that are in-turn aggregated and displayed to other users. User
reviews are also being used to build trust between customers in decentralized marketplaces
like eBay, Airbnb and Uber. This trust between users is a cornerstone for the success of any
such marketplace, where customers interact and make financial transactions with strangers.
For online shoppers, reviews are not just an option anymore but an expectation. A recent
survey1 found that 30% of shoppers (under the age of 45) consult reviews for every purchase
they make, while 86% say that reviews are essential in making purchase decisions. In fact,
after price, reviews are the factor with the most impact on purchases.
Apart from the widespread adoption of online reviews, an extensive literature has show-
cased the economic importance of positive reviews. A 1-star increase in the Yelp ratings
of a restaurant can cause a 5–9% increase in revenue (Luca, 2011), and an extra half-star
can help a restaurant sell out its reservations 50% more frequently (Anderson and Magruder,
2012). Positive correlations between ratings and sales have been found for products on Ama-
zon (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006), for new products (Cui et al., 2012), for movies (Dellarocas
et al., 2005)2 and for apps in Google’s mobile app store, (Engstrom and Forsell, 2014). On
two-sided marketplaces such as eBay, an extensive literature has found that positive user
feedback leads to economic benefits (Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010; Houser and Wooders, 2006;
Resnick et al., 2006).
Besides the widespread adoption and demonstrated economic significance of online user
reviews, another line of research has examined the biases that govern the submission of
online user reviews. Social influence bias, which, roughly speaking, is when a user’s opinion
is influenced by the opinions of other users, is one of the main ones studied in the literature.
For example, Muchnik et al. (2013) showed that an arbitrary positive vote on a comment
submitted to a news aggregator website created accumulating positive herding that increased
final ratings by 25% on average. Salganik et al. (2006) created an artificial music market
where participants downloaded previously unknown songs, either with or without information
about the previous participants’ actions, and found that the display of social signals increases
the inequality and unpredictability of success.
In addition to social influence, another bias that has been studied in the literature is
the selection bias which, roughly speaking, is when the set of users that submit a review
is not representative of the entire purchasing population. For example, Hu et al. (2009)
have demonstrated that review distributions on online platforms tend to be bi-modular,
suggesting that extremely satisfied and extremely dissatisfied customers are more likely to
submit a review. Furthermore, Li and Hitt (2008) and Godes and Silva (2012) have shown
that online reviews exhibit temporal trends, indicating that users who submit a review later
in a product’s life cycle are generally different than users that review earlier. Moreover, the
propensity of a user to review can be a function not only of their opinion about the product,
but also of the current state of the reviews (Nagle and Riedl, 2014).
With online reviews being omnipresent, economically influential and biased, the success
of establishments, products or agents in a two-sided marketplace can be decided by factors
1http://www.powerreviews.com/blog/survey-confirms-the-value-of-reviews/
2Duan et al. (2008) found significant correlation between a movie’s box office revenue and the volume of
online user reviews, but not with the ratings
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other than their true quality. Hence there is a need to understand the biases that govern
online reviews and suggest ways to fix them. Our paper is contributing to this literature.
We ask and explore two main questions. First, how do different populations differ when
they write reviews for the same set of products? We examine two populations: (1) users
that are self-motivated to write a review, i.e., users that, after their purchase, visited a
retailer’s webpage and did all the necessary steps to submit a review, and (2) prompted
reviewers, i.e., users that submitted a review after receiving an email from (or on behalf of)
a retailer soliciting a review for a product they recently bought. Throughout this work, we
will refer to self-motivated reviews as web reviews indicating the fact that they came through
the web and to email-prompted reviews as email reviews. Accordingly, we will refer to the
author of a web (email) review as a web (email) reviewer. We find that email reviews are
significantly and substantially more positive than web reviews, indicating that dissatisfied
customers are more likely to be self-motivated to write a review. This is a finding that is in
line with (and perhaps an eWOM version of) Anderson (1998), that found that dissatisfied
customers engage in greater WOM than satisfied ones. Moreover, we find that email reviews
are stable over time while web reviews exhibit a downward trend, indicating that the display
of various social signals throughout the process of a web review submission induces selection
and perhaps social influence biases.
Since, for some retailers, soliciting reviews using emails is a relatively recent phenomenon,
we are interested in understanding how the introduction of these email promptings affected
the entire review ecosystem and the existing reviewing population in particular. Hence,
our second question has two parts. How did the reviewing population and their submitted
reviews change? And, in particular, how did the self-motivated reviewing population and
the reviews they submit change as a result of the introduction of email prompts. Even
though we find an overall increase in volume and star-rating average, we find no evidence of
disturbances in the self-motivated population or in their submitted reviews. This indicates
that sending email prompts taps into an entirely new segment of the purchasing population
without disturbing the population that is already reviewing, making the new set of reviews
more representative. Since the new population of email reviewers are all verified buyers
(email promptings are sent only to verified buyers), the reviews overall become also more
credible. And finally, since email reviews carry higher ratings than web reviews, the new set
of reviews becomes more positive.
Our dataset is comprised of the entire review history of four major online retailers in dif-
ferent categories that, between the four of them, sell a wide variety of electronics, appliances,
bedding, kitchen, jewelry, personal care and health products. Each datapoint represents a
submitted review and carries, amongst other, the following information: review rating, re-
view text, date submitted, product id, number of ‘Helpful’ votes, number of ‘Not Helpful’
votes, and a source. The source can take two values: ‘web’ or ’email’, indicating if the review
is a web or email review, as defined above.
3
2 Differences Between Self-Motivated and Prompted
Reviews
In this section we examine the differences that email and web reviews exhibit with respect
to some key metrics, including review rating and volume.
Our dataset consists of 238,809 reviews for 27,574 unique products, across four major
online retailers. For each review we know the review rating, which is an integer between 1
and 5 indicating the number of stars that the user submitted for the product and review
text, which is the actual text of the review accompanying the rating.
In order to study temporal trends, we calculate each review’s arrival rank. This is an
integer indicating the chronological order in which a review arrived, amongst all other reviews
for the same product. Note that the arrival rank doesn’t take into account the actual time
a review was submitted, but only the relative order amongst all other reviews for the same
product.
Our dataset also captures the votes (‘Helpful’ or ‘Not Helpful’) that users submitted
regarding the helpfulness of an existing review. Using this data, we compute, for each
review, the variables helpful votes, indicating how many users voted on the helpfulness of
that review, and helpful score indicating the percentage of those votes that were positive.
Note that no registration or purchase is required for casting a vote on the helpfulness of an
existing review.
Anderson (1998) found that dissatisfied customers are more likely to be vocal about
their dissatisfaction than satisfied customers about their satisfaction, and we expect this
phenomenon to induce a selection bias, where self-motivated reviewers are more likely to be
dissatisfied. Hence, we expect to see a larger percentage of lower ratings coming from web
reviews than email reviews. Indeed, we find that the average web rating is 3.88 compared to
4.3 for email reviews. A look at the distributions of the two sets of reviews, shown in Figure
1a, provides further confirmation that web reviews tend to be more negative than email
reviews. We notice that email reviews have a higher percentage of 4- and 5-star ratings, a
roughly equal percentage of 3-star ratings and substantially lower percentage of 1- and 2-star
ratings.
Hence, the distribution of web reviews is ‘J-shaped’ (see e.g., Hu et al. (2009)) which
is frequently observed in online user platforms that are populated mainly by self-motivated
reviews (such as Amazon and Yelp).
Each email review lives in its own silo: there are no social signals on the email promptings
sent, and if a reviewer decides to follow the link and submit a review as a result of the
prompting they are taken to an isolated page where no information about the current state
of the reviews is displayed. In contrast, web reviewers observe social signals about the current
state of the reviews throughout the entire reviewing process. Hence, not only the review that
a user submits can be influenced by the existing reviews (i.e., social influence bias) but even
the decision of a user to submit a review can be influenced by the current state of the reviews
(i.e., selection bias). Indeed, Godes and Silva (2012) observed a downward slope for reviews
on Amazon.com (a platform that is comprised mainly by self-motivated reviews). Hence, we
would expect to see a similar temporal trend from the web reviews in our dataset but not
from the email reviews. Figure 1b displays the evolution of average ratings by the review’s
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arrival rank with 95% confidence bands. As expected, the plot suggests that email reviews
are stable over time (i.e., the 20th email review for a product is, on average, equal to the 1st
email review for that product), while web reviews display a downward temporal trend.
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Figure 1: Rating Distribution and Evolution for Web and Email Reviews.
We also expect to see differences in the text that is submitted by web and email reviews.
A large body of work has demonstrated that intrinsic motivation is a strong predictor of
high quality work, see e.g., Cerasoli et al. (2014) for a survey of that literature. In this paper
we focus on the review text length as an approximation to its quality, and hence we expect
to see web reviews to be longer. Other measures for the quality of the review text could be
explored in future work. Indeed, we find that web reviews have on average 300 characters
compared to 160 for email reviews.
When products have numerous reviews, users may be selecting just a few to read. Various
platforms, in an effort to help customers identify influential or high quality reviews, allow
browsing users to provide feedback on the existing reviews. This feedback is usually in
the form of a positive or negative vote, indicating if the review was helpful to the reading
user or not. Many platforms allow customers to sort the existing reviews according to their
helpfulness and some take it one step further by making this display ordering their default
one. Hence, we expect these helpful reviews to be disproportionally influential in the purchase
decisions of browsing customers, and we seek to understand better what are the factors that
make them being perceived as helpful. Previous literature has shown a positive correlation
between lower ratings and higher perceived helpfulness (Bakhshi et al., 2014). Since, in
general, web reviews carry lower ratings than email reviews we would expect to see web
reviews to have a higher helpful score (i.e., number of positive votes divided by the number
of all votes). Interestingly, we observe no substantial difference, with the helpful score being
around 83% for both sets of reviews. Where we do see a difference, is on helpful votes, i.e.,
the number of votes a review received. Web reviews receive 1.2 votes on average while email
reviews receive 0.8. This is despite web reviews generally arriving later than email reviews.
This higher number of votes could be explained by the larger text that web reviews have
and which might indicate a more in-depth analysis of the product. In fact, recent work has
shown a positive correlation between a review’s text length and it’s readability, Salehan and
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Kim (2016)
2.1 Econometric Model
Following our exploratory analysis, we now turn to an econometric model to provide statis-
tical tests for our descriptive results. Our general econometric model is as follows,
y = α0 + β1web + β2rank + β3web · rank + e, (1)
where web is a binary variable indicating a web review, and rank is an integer variable
indicating the arrival rank of the review. The coefficient of the rank variable will detect any
temporal trends the reviews may exhibit. We add the interaction variable web·rank to detect
any differences in the temporal trends that each set of reviews exhibit. The error term is e.
We start by estimating Model 1 with the review rating being the dependent variable. This
will show if the differences we observe in the average rating and temporal trends between
web and email reviews are statistically significant. We also estimate Model 1 with the review
length as the dependent variable, in order to explore any differences between the text of the
reviews submitted by web and email reviews. Finally, we seek to understand if there are
differences between how many helpful votes web and email reviews receive, and if one set of
reviews is generally perceived, by the users, as more helpful. Hence, we estimate Model 1
with respect to the helpful votes and helpful score metrics as well.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the estimations of Model 1.
Dependent Variable Intercept web rank web·rank
Review Rating
4.366∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −2.5 · 10−5 −0.0125∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0) (0.001)
Log Review Length
4.668∗∗∗ 0.7608∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0018
(0.006) (0.01) (0) (0.001)
Helpful Votes
1.187∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001)
Helpful Score
0.83∗∗∗ 0.011∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ : p < 0.001
Table 1: Quantitative and qualitative differences between web and email reviews
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2.2 Results
We discuss here the results from the estimations of Model 1 and how they confirm the
exploratory results we presented above.
Rating The first row of Table 1 shows the result of the Model 1 estimation with review
rating as the dependent variable, and it shows a highly significant, substantial and negative
coefficient for the web variable. This result confirms our exploratory analysis findings, shown
in Figure 1a, that email reviews are 0.37 higher than web reviews.
Furthermore, the coefficient for rank is not statistically significantly different from zero,
indicating that email reviews do not display any temporal trends whereas the coefficient for
web·rank is negative and highly significant, indicating a downward slope for web reviews.
This finding agrees with the exploratory analysis finding shown in Figure 1b, and with
previous literature that has focused on self-motivated reviews (Godes and Silva, 2012). In
fact, in further agreement between the behavior of the web reviews in our dataset and the
(mainly self-motivated) reviews of Godes and Silva (2012), we observe a similar downward
trend even if we order the reviews by their arrived time, i.e., how many days in the life cycle
of the product they were submitted. Email reviews are stable over time, even with respect
to this metric.
These differences between the temporal trends of web and email reviews provide support
for the existence of selection and social influence biases when social signals are being displayed
during the review process (as it happens with web reviews and doesn’t happen with email
reviews).
Review Text The estimation of Model 1 with the logarithm of the review length as a
dependent variable, shown in the second row of Table 1, shows that indeed web reviews have
statistically significant and substantially larger text. Since web reviewers are self-motivated,
this finding may be related to an extensive literature that has shown the intrinsic motivation
produce higher quality results than external incentives (see e.g., Cerasoli et al. (2014) for
a survey). Furthermore, the estimation shows no temporal trend for the review length of
web reviews and a significant but very weak downward trend for the review length of email
reviews.
Helpfulness Finally, we turn our attention to helpfulness. Note that a browsing user
cannot distinguish if a review comes from the web or email. They only see a‘Verified Buyer’
sticker under each review that comes from such a customer. All email reviews carry that
sticker and almost none of the web reviews do, although review readers do not know that
verified buyers are nearly synonymous with email reviews.
Our exploratory analysis showed that web reviews receive generally more votes (positive
or negative) regarding their helpfulness and the third row of Table 1 confirms this finding as
highly statistically significant. This is related to recent work by Salehan and Kim (2016) who
found a positive correlation between the length of a review and it’s readership. Moreover, as
reviews that are in the system longer have more time to accumulate votes, one would expect
the number of votes a review receives to decline with respect to its arrival rank. Indeed, the
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highly statistically significant and negative values for the coefficients of rank and web·rank,
shown in Table 1, confirm that expectation for both email and web reviews.
The number of votes a review receives, however, is perhaps not as important as the
percentage of those votes that are positive. As we explained earlier, we define the helpful
score of a review to be the number of ‘helpful’ votes it received divided by the total number
of votes it received. In our exploratory analysis we found that both web and email reviews
have a helpful score of around 83%. Even though the coefficient for web, shown in the fourth
row of Table 1, is positive and significant, indicating that web reviews have a higher helpful
score than email reviews, its coefficient is fairly small (0.01) compared to the intercept (0.83).
The negative and highly statistically significant coefficient for rank and web·rank indicate
that reviews with higher arrival ranks (i.e., reviews that are submitted later in a product’s
life cycle) have, on average, lower helpful scores. This can be explained by the fact that for
all four of the retailers in our dataset, the default sorting of the reviews is by their helpful
score. Hence, a rich-get-richer effect takes place with reviews that are perceived as helpful
being displayed to more users and being more likely to receive further positive helpful votes.
3 The Effect of the Introduction of Email Reviews
Some of the retailers in our dataset operated for many years, since their creation, without
sending email promptings to their customers. Hence, we see the opportunity to approach
the introduction of the email promptings as a natural experiment, and explore the effect it
had on the retailer’s review ecosystem.
In order to approximate the exact date that a retailer started sending out email prompt-
ings to their customers, we observe the first email review that was submitted in that retailer’s
platform. We then keep all the reviews that were submitted in the three months before the
email review introduction and the three months after. We consider this set of reviews to be
the ‘treatment’ year, in contrast to another set of reviews we get for control. Our control set
of reviews consists of those submitted in the same six-month period exactly one year before
the treatment. Hence, if the email reviews were introduced for a retailer on June 1, 2012
our treatment group of reviews is comprised of those submitted in the period March 1 –
September 1, 2012 while our control group consists of those submitted in the period March
1 – September 1, 2011. We then use a difference-in-differences approach to understand any
effect the email introduction had. We use the control group of reviews to control for temporal
and other trends.
We start with an exploratory look into the data. First, we are interested in understanding
the effect in the volume of submitted reviews and we expect to see an increase. Indeed, we
find that in the 90 days following the introduction of the email promptings, the volume of
reviews increased from around 30 reviews per day to 38 reviews per day. Figure 2a shows the
evolution of the volume of reviews per day for the 90 days before the prompts started and the
90 days after. We see an overall increase in volume, but we also see a decrease in the volume
of web reviews submitted, from 30 reviews per day to 19. One potential explanation for this
decrease in the volume of web reviews could be that the email promptings cannibalized the
web reviews, i.e., they redirected users that would have submitted a review anyway. Another
explanation could be that the decline in the volume of web reviews would have happened
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anyway because of temporal or other (unrelated to the introduction of the promptings)
reasons. In order to get a clear picture, we use our control dataset of reviews. We find
that the decrease in the volume of the reviews in the treatment year should have been
expected even without the introduction of the email promptings, hence we find no evidence
of cannibalization.
We also explore the effect of the promptings on the characteristics of the submitted re-
views. From our findings in Section 2, which showed that email reviews carry, in general,
higher ratings than web reviews, we expect email reviews to raise the overall average ratings,
and indeed we observe an immediate impact from the promptings: the average rating in-
creases from 3.8 to 4.1. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2b there does not seem to be any
substantial disturbance in the distribution of web reviews; the average web rating remains
roughly stable at 3.8.
Finally, we explore the effect on the review text as well. From our results in Section
2 we know that email reviews are on average shorter, hence we expect their introduction
to decrease the average review text length. Indeed, we see a decrease from around 242
characters to 195.
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Figure 2: Volume and Review Rating before and after the introduction of email reviews
3.1 Econometric Model
In this section we estimate the following model in order to provide statistical rigor to our
exploratory results reported above.
y = α0 + β1treat + β2post + β3treat · post + e. (2)
The treat variable indicates if the review is in the treatment or control year. The post
variable indicates if the review was submitted after the treatment, i.e., in the last three
months of the studied period. The post·treat variable represents the interaction of the treat
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and post variables and, mathematically, it estimates the variation in the treatment group
that is not explained by the control group. The error term is e.
We are interested in two questions: 1) What was the effect of the email promptings on the
entire review platform of the retailer, and, in particular, 2) What was the effect of the email
promptings on the existing reviewing population of the retailer, i.e., the web reviews. Model
2 can be used to answer both of the above questions. Table 2 summarizes the results when
we estimate Model 2 on the entire treatment and control datasets and Table 3 summarizes
the results when we estimate Model 2 while restricting our attention only on web reviews
(treatment and control).
Dependent Variable Intercept treat post treat·post
Volume
0.015∗∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0034∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002)
Review Rating
4.05∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ -0.02 0.27∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.03) (0.02) (0.043)
Log Review Length
5.29∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.003 −0.3∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.016) (0.01) (0.02)
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ : p < 0.001
Table 2: Effect of the email reviews introduction on the entire review ecosystem
3.2 Results
We discuss here the results of the model estimations.
Volume Figure 2a showed an increase in the volume of reviews overall but a decrease in
the volume of web reviews. The first row of Table 2 displays the results of the estimation
of Model 2 with volume as the dependent variable using the entire set of reviews (i.e., web
and email). The highly significant and positive coefficient for post·treat confirms that indeed
the overall increase in volume is statistically significant. When we estimate Model 2 while
restricting our data only on the web reviews, we see that there is no observable effect on the
volume of web reviews from the introduction of email reviews (first row of Table 3). Hence,
there is no evidence of cannibalization and the decline in the volume of web reviews should
have been expected anyway, even without the introduction of email reviews.
These findings suggest that by sending email promptings, a retailer can incentivize an
entirely new segment of their purchasing customer base to submit a review, without affecting
10
Dependent Variable Intercept treat post treat·post
Volume
0.015∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0009
(0) (0) (0) (0.001)
Review Rating
4.05∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗∗ -0.023 0.09
(0.15) (0.03) (0.022) (0.05)
Log Review Length
5.3∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.003 0.04
(0.007) (0.015) (0.01) (0.024)
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ : p < 0.001
Table 3: Effect of the email reviews introduction on the web reviews
the behavior of web reviewers. This means, that the new overall set of reviews can be more
representative.
Rating Having established that the volume of web reviews is unaffected by the introduction
of the email reviews, it’s interesting to see if there is any change in the actual reviews that
the web reviewers submit. Our exploratory analysis suggests that there is an increase in
the ratings overall but no effect in the ratings coming from web reviews. The second row
of Tables 2 and 3 confirm both of these results. The coefficient for post·treat is highly
significant and positive when Model 2 is estimated on the entire dataset, which indicates
an overall increase in star rating. In contrast, the coefficient for the same variable is not
significantly different from zero when we estimate Model 2 only on web reviews, which
indicates no change in their star rating. Hence, by sending email promptings, a retailer can
access a population that submits, on average, higher ratings without affecting the ratings of
the web reviewers.
Review length In addition to review rating, we want to see the effect that the email
reviews had on the review length overall and on the review length of web reviews in par-
ticular. Our exploratory analysis showed a decrease on the average review text length and
the coefficient for treat·post, shown in the third row of Table 2, is negative and statistically
significant, hence confirming the result. In contrast, the coefficient for the same variable
in the model estimation based only on web reviews, shown in Table 3, is not statistically
different from zero, indicating that even though the email reviews had a negative effect on
the length of reviews overall, they had no effect on the length of web reviews.
Our overall findings in this section suggest that the email promptings incentivized an
entirely new segment of the purchasing population to submit a review, without having any
effect on the volume of existing reviewers or the characteristics of their submitted reviews.
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4 Insights and Conclusion
As far as we are aware, our work is the first to compare two fundamentally different sets of
reviews for the same products, at the same platform during the same time period. Much
existing work has focused on product reviews from platforms like Amazon and Yelp, both
platforms that are populated almost entirely by self-motivated reviews. Using our dataset,
we are able to replicate many findings that have appeared in that literature, such as the
downward trend (Godes and Silva, 2012) and bi-modularity (Hu et al., 2009) of reviews.
But our dataset, also provides insights on a different set of reviews; the reviews that come
as a result of an email prompt. We find that these email reviews carry consistently higher
ratings than web reviews and do not exhibit any temporal trends.
Furthermore, the introduction of email prompts does not disturb in any way the existing
reviewing population while it incentivizes an entirely new segment of the population to
submit a review. We think that this finding should provide motivation to retailers to send
email prompts to their verified buyers. The reviews overall will become more representative
(since a larger segment of the population will be reviewing), more credible (since the new
segment of the population that starts reviewing are all verified buyers) and the ratings overall
will increase (since the email ratings are on average higher than web ratings). Recent work
(Zhang et al., 2014) has shown that source credibility and quantity of reviews can have
positive effects on the user’s purchase intention. Since the introduction of email prompts
will increase the number of submitted reviews and each such submission will be from a
‘Verified Buyer’, the work by Zhang et al. (2014) suggests that the retailer should expect to
see substantial economic benefits from such an introduction.
Beyond the review collection, online retailers must also make decisions about how they
display the reviews to their users. Currently, most online retailers provide the ability for
users to sort the existing reviews by recency, star rating or helpful score. We expect that
the default options each retailer implements can have substantial effects on the purchasing
decisions of users. Here, we propose an additional policy for retailers to consider: by default,
display the average star rating based only on reviews submitted by verified buyers. Since
one of the main ways that such verification can happen is by responding to an email prompt
from the retailer, these verified reviews will comprise mainly by email reviews that are
less bi-modular and stable over time. Hence, they can be a more accurate and credible
representation of the true underlying quality of the reviewed product. Moreover, they can
be perceived by the reading user as from a more credible source (since they will be submitted
by verified buyers), which can have positive effects on the user’s purchasing intent (Zhang
et al., 2014). Furthermore, this approach can de-incentivize fake reviews (from unverified
buyers), a problem that is becoming increasingly prominent (Hu et al., 2011, 2012; Luca and
Zervas, 2015; Mayzlin et al., 2012).
5 Future Directions
Having argued about the desirable properties that email reviews have, as well the economic
benefits they may bring to the retailer, one may ask how aggressively should a retailer
pursue such email reviews? For example, a retailer may send multiple email prompts or offer
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monetary incentives. We believe more research is needed towards understanding the biases
that such strategies can introduce in the selection of the reviewing population as well as their
submitted reviews. For example, what types of users will be more likely to respond to various
types of monetary or social incentives? Can multiple emails annoy the user into submitting a
lower rating than they would have otherwise? Or can monetary incentives positively influence
the user’s perception of the product (and hence their submitted rating)? Insights towards
this direction can help practitioners optimally design their review solicitation process.
Another interesting future direction is to understand which set of reviews (web or email)
is in more agreement with expert ratings, such as ones provided by the Consumer Report
magazine. De Langhe et al. (2015) found that average user ratings correlate poorly with
Consumer Report scores. Moreover, they found that average user ratings are bad at pre-
dicting resale values for products. Interestingly, the dataset analyzed by De Langhe et al.
(2015) is comprised entirely of reviews from Amazon, a platform where the vast majority of
reviews are, in the terminology of this paper, web reviews. Would the performance of the
average rating (towards the goal of predicting Consumer Report scores and resale values)
be improved if email reviews were taken into account? Could email reviews perform even
better if considered alone? Insights here can help us understand which set of reviews (web
or email) are a more accurate representation of a product’s true quality.
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